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COMMENTS
THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN WISCONSIN
The doctrine of cy res, which is used by the courts of equity to
save a charitable trust which would otherwise fail, has traveled a rocky
road in the state of Wisconsin. The supreme court has transversed
from expressed refutation of the doctrine,1 to implied acceptance or use
of substitute doctrines to reach similar results,2 and finally to outright
acceptance of the doctrine.3 During the course of this journey, the
court has taken questionable routes by way of decisions which were
clearly contrary to the general trend of the law4 and has encountered
difficulty in following preferred routes indicated by the directory
statutes enacted by the legislature.5
In this comment the doctrine of cy pres, as recognized by the
majority of jurisdictions and the leading authorities on the subject,
will be broadly set forth followed by a historical analysis of the doc-
trine as it has been interpreted in the decisions of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court. An attempt will be made to correlate these two so as to
produce a basis for speculation as to what is the current attitude of the
Wisconsin court towards the doctrine.
ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF CY PRES
The term cy pres is generally held to have its origin in the Norman
French expression "cy pres comme possible" and literally translated
means "so near"' G or "as near as possible."'7 If pronounced under the
rules of pronunciation governing the language of its origin, the proper
pronunciation would be as if it were spelled "see pray.",, Anglicization
of the term would logically result in it being pronounced as if spelled
"sigh press," but the common practice in the United States is to mix
1 Ruth v. Oberbrunner, 40 Wis. 238 (1876); Heiss v. Murphy, 40 Wis. 276,
292 (1876). The doctrine of cy pres ". . is a doctrine of prerogative or
sovereign function, and not strictly a judicial power"; Will of Fuller, 75
Wis. 431, 44 N.W. 304 (1890); McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166, 72 N.W.
31 (1898).
2 Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 28 N.W. 353 (1886) (cy pres recognized
as existing under certain limited conditions); Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis.
70, affirmed 1 N.WA. 92 (1872) (use of doctrine of equitable conversion to
avoid prohibition against charitable trusts of realty); Harrington v. Pier,
105 Wis. 485, 82 N.W. 354 (1900) (cy pres available "... as the term is found
used in regard to thoseliberalrulesof judicial construction applied by courts
of equity to charitable trusts ... ") ; Estate of Briggs, 189 Wis. 524, 208 N.W.
247.
3 See Estate of Bletch, 25 Wis. 2d 40, 130 N.W. 2d 275 (1964).
4See Tharp v. Seventh Day Adventist Church, 182 Wis. 107, 195 N.W. 331(1923).
5 Wis. STAT. §§231.11(7) (b), (c), and (d) (1963).
See OxFoRD ENGUSEi DICTIONARY, cy pres.
7 Ironmongers Company v. Attorney General, 10 Cl. & F. 908, 922 (1844).
8 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, §431 (2d ed. 1964).
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the French and the English pronunciations with the result that it is
pronounced "sigh pray."9
Although there are opinions to the effect that the doctrine originated
or was applied as early as the third century in Rome before Con-
stantine,10 it is clear that the greater development of the doctrine was
effectuated by the English Chancery court in the Middle Ages. This
extensive use of the doctrine by the Chancellors was logical due to the
fact that the majority of the gifts to charity were in aid of religion
and a strong ecclesiastical influence was exerted upon the medieval
equity law by the clerical judges."
The doctrine, as exercised in England during this period, was
divided into two separate and distinct branches or categories. The first
of these was judicial cy pres:
Under this doctrine, the courts attempt, in part at least and nearly
as practicable, to carry out the testators' intention."
Judicial cy pres in this traditional form is the only branch of the
doctrine now expressly recognized in the United States and it will be
this form of the doctrine which will be more fully analyzed. But, the
other original branch of the doctrine, to wit, prerogative cy pres, must
be mentioned for it contributed greatly to the courts' confused rejec-
tion of the doctrine in toto for a number of years in Wisconsin.
The prerogative doctrine of cy pres is described by Scott as fol-
lows:"3
Under the prerogative doctrine, the Crown as parens patriae,
was permitted in certain cases to apply the property for any
charitable purpose it might select. The King, in the exercise
of this prerogative power, was under no duty, save perhaps
moral duty, to consider what would probably have been the
wishes of the testator. He would indicate in writing over his
signature or sign manual the disposition which he wished to
be made of the property, and the chancellor would thereupon
order that disposition to be made.
It was the courts' confusion between the two types of cy pres, and
its recognition that the application of the prerogative cy pres doctrine
was inimical to the attitudes of the citizens living under a democratic
form of government that contributed greatly to the initial total rejec-
ion of the docrine in the United States.
9 Ibid.
1o 3 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §1518 (14th ed. 1918).
"BOGERT, supra note 8, at 393: "Medieval equity law developed under ecclesi-
astical influence. Many of the ancient gifts for charity were donations in the
aid of religion. It was natural that the clerical judges should struggle to save
gifts for the benefit of the religious institutions."




But, even in England, the exercise of prerogative cy pres was lim-
ited generally to two classes of cases:14
1. Where the purpose to which the property was to be applied
was illegal, but would have been charitable except for this
illegal nature.
2. Where the purpose to which the property was to be applied
was not designated nor was a trustee appointed to administer
the property, but the property was given directly "to charity."
The first of these instances is illustrated in the famous case of Da
Costa v. De Pa,15 which involved a gift to a forbidden or illegal society.
The society here was one to foster the reading of the Jewish law and
instruction in the Jewish faith, which at that time was illegal as against
the state established religion. The King, under the exercise of the
power of prerogative cy pres, directed the fund to be applied to in-
struct children in the Christian faith. It was this arbitrary and caprici-
ous use of the prerogative cy pres which the early courts of the United
States feared and which, due to a failure of the courts to distinguish
between the two distinct branches, prompted the court to reject the
doctrine in all forms.
The second class of cases giving rise to the application of the
doctrine of prerogative cy pres in England, where property is given
to charity generally and no one is named as trustee to select a particular
charity and administer the property, would probably today call for
the application of judicial cy pres in most jurisdictions in the United
States and result in the court appointment of an administrator and
approval of a scheme for the distribution of the property.'6 This is
true despite the fact, discussed more fully later in this comment, that
the technical requirements for the application of the traditional doc-
trine of judicial cy pres are not truly satisfied in the general gift to
charity.
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PREROGATIVE CY PRES
IN THE UNITED STATES
Although the doctrine of prerogative cy pres as such is not recog-
nized in the United States,'7 the courts have on occasion exercised
powers under circumstances which, if used in England, would have
called for the operation of prerogative cy pres. The modern doctrine
of judicial cy pres when used where the traditional prerogative cy
pres would have been used, is most frequently used where Scott's
14 Ibid.
15 1 Amb. 228, 7 Ves. 76, 2 Swanst. 487 note. I Dick 238 (1754).
' ScoTr, op. cit. supra note 12.
'7 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, §434, (2d ed. 1964) ; 4 ScoTw, Scorr oI, TRusTs,
§399.1, (2d ed. 1956) ; But see Will of Lott, 193 Wis. 409, 214 N.W. 391 (1927),
wherein it is stated that the legislature succeeds to the prerogative of the
crown.
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second category of circumstances calling for the operation of the
doctrine of prerogative cy pres are found to exist, to wit, where prop-
erty was given directly to charity without a designation of the purposes
to which it is to be put and without designating a trustee to administer
the funds. The latter defect is cured by statutory enactments in most
jurisdictions to the effect that a trust shall not fail due to the absence
of an appointment of a trustee.18 The main defect in such a gift is
that it is directly to charity without a designation of the specific pur-
pose to which it is to be put. This has been cured by many courts by
the doctrine of judicial cy pres despite the fact that the technical re-
quirements for its application are not present. Bogert states that the
more rational handling of these situations is the interpretation of the
settlor's intention to have been that the trustee was to have discretion
as to the use of the funds, in which case there would be no need to
resort to the doctrine of cy pres. 19
It is sometimes stated that the application of the modern doctrine
of cy pres, as between the two traditional circumstances calling for the
doctrine of prerogative cy pres, has been limited to Scott's second
category. But it is erroneous to assume this because cases exist in the
United States where the illegality of a designated purpose to which
property was to be applied was held not to defeat the charitable trust.20
However, these cases of a charitable trust directing the accomplishment
of an illegal end will qualify for the application of the doctrine of cy
pres only when that end would retain its charitable characteristic were
it not for the illegality. Thus, although these circumstances clearly fall
within Scott's first classification of when the English doctrine of pre-
rogative cy pres was applicable it is evident that when the doctrine
is applied in the United States, it is not an exercise of the traidtional
English rule of prerogative cy pres because the court has not acted
arbitrarily but has endeavored to conform the gift to the general charit-
able intent of the settlor. Therefore, perhaps Scott's two classifications
of when the prerogative powers of cy pres were applicable have only
historical value and should not in themselves be utilized as a distin-
guishing test as to whether the prerogative or judicial power of cy
pres is being exercised. The lack of restraint or control on the king's
selection for the application of the fund should be the exclusive dis-
tinguishing element when the two powers are contrasted.
18RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, §397 (1959): 4 SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS,
§§397-397.5 (2d ed. 1956); Will of Kavanaugh, 143 Wis. 90, 102, 26 N.W.
672 (1910) "In charitable bequests no trustee need be named, as a charity
will not be allowed to fail for want of a trustee."
19 BOCERT, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, §434 (2d ed. 1964).
20 Atty. General v. Vint, 3 DeG & Sm 704 (gift to furnish inmates of penal




Although there has been limited expression by the courts that in
the United States the power of prerogative cy pres reposes in the state
legislatures, this idea is rejected by both Bogert2' and Scott.22
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL CY PREs
IN THE UNITED STATES
The modem doctrine of cy pres is defined somewhat differently
by various authorities,2 3 but generally has been stated as follows:"
... it is the doctrine that equity will, when a charity is originally
or later becomes impossible, inexpedient, or impracticable of ful-
fillment, substitute another charitable object which is believed to
approach the original purpose as closely as possible.
The doctrine of judicial cy pres has been thoroughly analyzed and
digested in the works of the various authorities on trusts. For the pur-
poses of the following brief analysis of the doctrine, the works of
Scott2 5 and that of Bogert26 will be used and, when differences arise,
interrelated and compared. In addition to these two authorities, the
exhaustive monograph on the doctrine of cy pres by Fisch27 will also
be utilized.
Generally, before the doctrine can be applied, three basic pre-
requisites must be met :28
a. The court must determine that the gift creates a valid charit-
able trust.
b. It must be established that the intention of the charitable
trust cannot be effected due to impossibility, inexpediency
or impracticability of fulfillment.
c. It must be determined that the settlor possessed a general
charitable intention underlying the expressed specific charit-
able intention.
It is not within the scope of this article to examine the somewhat
complex problem of what is and what is not a "charitable" gift or trust.
Suffice to say that the doctrine is applicable only where a charitable
21 Note 19, supra.
22 Note 12, supra.
23 Compare with 4 SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS, §399 (2d ed. 1956) : "The principle
under which the courts . . . attempt to save a charitable trust from failure
by carrying out the more general purpose of the testator and carrying out
approximately although not exactly his more specific intent is called the
doctrine of cy pres." Also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, §399 (1959) : "If
property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,
and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the
particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to
devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the
court will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose
which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor."
24 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 19, §431.
25 SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS (2d ed. 1956).
26 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (2d ed. 1964).
27 Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States (1950).
28 Id. §5.00.
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trust exists and the courts will only find a charitable trust where the
gift is made for a purpose which is recognized by law as charitable.29
The doctrine itself will not be used by the courts to create charitable
trusts out of private trusts. Bogert states the rule as follows :30
Cy pres has no application to private trusts, nor does it permit
a court to turn an invalid effort to create a charitable trust into
an enforceable charity, or a mixed trust into one purely charit-
able. Before it can be applied, it must be found that the settlor
made provision for a trust which had as its sole purpose the
achievement of a public benefit.
The concurrent requirement that the charitable gift be in trust
originally gave the courts a great deal of trouble when the gift was
made directly to a named charitable organization without words of
trust. The early courts held in these cases that the doctrine of cy pres
was not applicable because of the absence of the trust.31 This strict
construction has been overcome by the current judicial policy of sus-
taining charitable gifts whenever possible. In the majority of juris-
dictions the general rule is as stated in In re Walters Estate :32
if it is reasonably certain that the testator intended that
the bequest be devoted to a purpose for charity, even though
there is no formal trust, a gift in trust will be implied.
Once the court has determined that the gift or devise is of a charit-
able nature, and a trust exists either by way of the expressed inten-
tion of the settlor or by implication due to the charitable nature of the
gift, the second prerequisite must be met, to wit, that the intention of
the settlor or purpose of the trust cannot be accomplished due to im-
possibility, impracticality or inexpediency. The existence of one or a
combination of these three impediments to the accomplishment of the
purpose of the trust may exist at the time the trust is created or may
arise anytime thereafter.
The impediment of impossibility is the one more frequently en-
countered by the courts although this term is often used to cover situ-
ations which might more properly be labeled impracticable or inex-
pedient. Thus, the following situations are cited by authorities as dem-
onstrating impossibility:
1.. . . the fund given is inadequate to accomplish any of the
charitable purposes of the settler, or limited or inefficient
administration will result from the small size of the fund.33
2... . [when] the income of the charitable trust is or becomes
more than sufficient to achieve all the charitable objectives
29Ibid.
30 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 24, §431.
31 Fisch, op. cit. supra note 27, §5.01 (a).
32 150 Misc. 512, 269 N.Y. Sup. 400. 405 (1933).
33 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 26, §438.
[Vol. 49
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named by the donor in the manner prescribed by him, cy
pres is generally applied to the surplus capital or income in
the discretion of the court, since there is an impossibility of
using it to advance any of the charitable purposes of the
settlor.3
4
3.... impossibility may arise from changes in the law or in
government or politics, or alteration with respect to health
and disease as where a disease becomes extinct or new
methods of treatments arise, or new developments in social,
business or industrial life . . . [or] . . . because the class to
receive the benefits becomes non-existent or a clause in the
trust instrument is illegal.35
Examples of "impracticable trusts," qualifying for the application
of the doctrine of cy pres are many and varied but generally involve
the directed application of funds or property which is insufficient or
unsuitable to accomplish or facilitate the accomplishment of the in-
tended charitable purpose of the gift.36
Scott 37 cites situations where the specific purpose of the trust has
already been accomplished as an example of impracticality. The fa-
mous example of this is the case of Jackson v. Phillips5 where the
testators intended that the corpus of the trust be applied to publicity
purposes so as to create public sentiment that would put an end to
slavery. While the case was under advisement the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was adopted. The court applied the doctrine of cy pres and di-
rected the funds be put to uses beneficial to the Negro race. But, this
could easily also be classified as a situation of "impossibility."
Thus, it is apparent that the terms impossibility, impracticality,
and inexpediency are not mutually exclusive as used in this context
and although a distinction may be made by the courts, it is often
difficult to correctly apply any one" of these terms to a situation which
the court will recognize as qualifying for the application of the doc-
trine of cy pres.
A distinction should be made between inconvenience or slight un-
desirability, on the one hand, and impossibility, impracticability and
inexpediency, on the other. The former will never suffice as a basis
for the courts substitution of a new scheme by the use of the doctrine
of cy pres. 39 Thus, the dissatisfaction of interested parties with the
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Stead v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 173 F. 2d 650, 84 US App. D.C. 358
(1949) (devise of land unsuitable for playground changed to use proceeds
to maintain public playground with tablet in memory of testator) ; Lippincott
Estate, 17 Pa. D. & C. 2d 80, 9 Fiduciary 391 (1959) (trust formed for blind
unable to be administered due to lack of facilities on part of trustees changed
to award income to institution for blind having adeqtiate facilities.)
374 ScoTw, op. cit. supra note 25, §399.2.
-3 14 Allen 539 (Mass. 1867).
39 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 24, §439.
19651
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results of the application of the funds will not justify a change.40 But,
as the courts continue to become more aware that a charitable trust
which no longer effectively accomplishes its purpose is not a service to
the community, they become more ready to find impossibility, imprac-
ticability, or inexpediency so as to be able to more effectively utilize
the available fund.
41
The final determination which must be made by the court before
the doctrine of cy pres can be applied is that the settlor had a general
charitable intent which should be allowed to prevail now that the spe-
cific purpose cannot be accomplished. The doctrine may not be used
to turn a narrow and particular charitable intent into a general charit-
able intent.42 The reason for this prerequisite that a general charitable
intent be ascertainable before the doctrine may be invoked is that the
doctrine of cy pres is grounded on the philosophy that the court is only
justified in directing that the funds be applied to the accomplishment
of a secondary purpose or objective when the settlor would have de-
sired this to be done in event that his expressed specific charitable
intention is frustrated. 43 Thus, in some jurisdictions where it is ex-
pressed by the settlor that a single specific charitable project should
be aided and none other 44 or it is ascertainable from the circumstances
surrounding the establishment of the trust that the settlor would have
preferred that the whole trust fail if the particular purpose becomes
impossible of accomplishment, the doctrine cannot be applied. 45
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States either expressly
require this general charitable intent or assume it to be necessary by
reason of the existing case law.46 To date, Pennsylvania is the only
state which has expressly dispensed with the requirement that a gen-
eral charitable intent be ascertainable before the doctrine of cy pres
may be applied.
4 7
The problem of determining whether or not the settlor was mo-
tivated by a general charitable intent in setting up the trust or making
40 Eliot v. Trinity Church, 232 Mass. 517, 122 N.E. 648 (1919) (Interested parties
dissatisfied with choice of statue under terms of trust for purpose of erecting
a statue of a famous man to be placed in a designated location.)
41 Fisch, op. cit. supra note 27, §5.02.
42 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 24, §431, note 16.
43 BOGaRT, op. cit. supra note 24, §436.
-44Ibid.
454 Scor, op. cit. supra note 25, §399.
46 BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 24, §436.
47 PA. STAT. (Purdon 1947) T. 20, §301.10: "Except as otherwise provided by
the conveyor, if the charitable purpose for which an interest shall be con-
veyed shall be or become indefinite or impossible or impractical of fulfillment
or if it shall not have been carried out for want of a trustee or because of the
failure of a trustee to designate such purpose, the court may, on application
of the trustee or of any interested person or of the Attorney General . . .
order an administration or distribution of the estate for a charitable purpose
in a manner as nearly as possible to fulfill the intention of the conveyor,
whether his charitable intent be general or specific." (emphasis added)
[Vol. 49
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the gift to charity is not always an easy conclusion to arrive at. Of
course, the settlor may have forseen the possibility of the failure of
his expressed particular charitable intention and expressly provided
that the trust was to terminate upon this happening or that he wished
the funds to be transferred by the court to a similar charitable activity
or that he wished the doctrine of cy pres to apply. Although this obvi-
ously would make the courts task significantly easier, this is seldom the
case. Thus, the courts have formulated general rules of construction
to utilize in attempting to determine if the testator possessed this
requisite general charitable intent. Where the settlor has provided for
an alternative disposition of the property upon the occurrence of the
failure of the particular purpose the doctrine is not ordinarily avail-
able. 48 But, where no gift over or reversion is expressed a general
charitable intent may be presumed.49 The fact that the bulk of the
settlor's estate is directed towards charitable purposes is evidence of a
general charitable in tent50 The converse is also true.51 The courts are
more inclined to find a general charitable intent where the charitable
gift has once taken effect and there has been a subsequent failure than
where the intent was frustrated prior to its ever taking effect.52 The
courts have been extremely reluctant to find a general charitable intent
where the object of the trust is a foreign charity although the reason-
ing behind these decisions is open to criticism.5 3 The fact that the
settlor has for a long period taken a personal interest in the desig-
nated charity or the scope of the effect of the charity is limited to a
small locality may defeat the finding of a general charitable intent.5 4
But, with the exception of gifts to foreign charities, the modern courts
may be generally counted on to strive to find a general charitable
intent. Thus, the fact that the trust excludes a particular use has been
used to find a general charitable intent on the theory that the exclusion
indicated that the settlor contemplated the failure of the paricular
scheme and foresaw the application of the res to the support of some
other charitable purpose.5 5 Also, a general chartiable intent has been
found despite the fact that the instrument provided that the property
48 Fisch, op. cit. supra note 27, §5.03(a), note 52.
4 Id. note 54.
5o0d. note 55.
5 Id. note 56.
52 Id. note 59.
53 Id. note 61. Fisch comments that this distinction between domestic and foreign
charities may emanate from the policy of attempting to keep property within
the state or country or in the administration difficulties associated with foreign
trusts.
54 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 24, §437.
55 Gremke v. Malone, 206 Aass. 49, 91 N.E. 899 (1910) (establishment of in-
dustrial home for colored children and "none other" and in no event for the
benefit of Roman Catholics.)
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be devoted "forever" 56 to the particular purpose or "to that purpose
and no other purpose"5' 7 or where the property was given "upon
condition."5"
The requirement of the finding of a general charitable intent before
the doctrine may be applied upon the failure of an expressed specific
or particular charitable purpose has been severely criticized. Bogert09
notes that unless the settlor has expressly provided for disposition of
the funds upon the failure of the particular purpose it is doubtful
that he ever gave any thought to their disposition in event that this
failure occurs. Also, that the basis for the court's determination that
a general charitable intent did exist can only be arrived at from an in-
terpretation of the donor's situation and interests and the language of
the trust instrument and the fact that courts have arrived at diametri-
cally opposite conclusions in cases involving similar facts prove the
unsatisfactoriness of the search for this general intent. Also, the re-
quirement that a general intent be ascertainable causes much expensive
and time consuming litigation. Bogert's solution to the problem is
stated as follows :60
Instead of continuing the present rule, it would seem prefer-
able to provide that the charitable intent shall be presumed to
be general, unless the settlor expressly negates the application
of cy pres; or to follow the Pennsylvania precedent and make
cy pres applicable whether the settlor's charitable intent was
found to be general or special.
After the court has determined that the three basic prerequisites
have been satisfied, it may proceed to apply the doctrine of judicial cy
pres to save the charitable trust. Whether the court's determination
that these basic prerequisites qualifying the trust for the operation of
the doctrine are themselves part of the doctrine or only a necessary
finding prior to the application of the doctrine is an academic question.
Suffice to say that once the court has found that the prerequisite con-
ditions exist it will proceed to direct the application of the property
to some charitable purpose which the court believes is "as near as
possible" to that originally designated by the settlor. There are no set
rules to govern the choice of this secondary purpose but, unlike the
method used by the king under the doctrine of prerogative cy pres,
the court is duty bound to attempt to evaluate what would probably
have been the wishes of the settlor.6 1
56 Fisch, op. cit. supra note 27, §5.03 (a), note 69.
5 Id. note 70. See also Fairbanks v. City of Appleton, 249 Wis. 476, 24 N.W.
2d 893 (1946) (property given on condition that it be used to create the trust
fund "for no other purposes except the uses and purposes outlined herein.")
5s Fisch, op. cit. supra note 27, §5.03 (a), note 71.





AN APPARENT ANOMALY-THE GIFT "To CHARITY"
As heretofore noted, a gift generally "to charity" will not fail due
to the lack of a trust because the trust will be imposed by implication.6 2
Similarly, the failure to appoint a trustee to administer a trust is not
fatal. But, gifts such as these have been held to be void on the ground
that they were too indefinite or vague for the court to enforce.
The leading authorities now hold that such trusts should not fail
and that the court should approve a scheme to carry out the settlor's
general charitable intentions.63 Although it is sometimes held that these
gifts "to charity" may be sustained by the exercise of the doctrine of
judicial cy pres, it is clear that if the requirements for the application
of the doctrine are strictly enforced such a gift or trust does not
qualify. The fact that gifts of this type may not meet the first re-
quirement that a valid charitable trust be created due to existing
statutes requiring a certain degree of definiteness and certainty should
not be a valid objection to the application of the doctrine because the
primary objective and purpose of the doctrine is that trusts which
express or reflect a settlor's charitable intenti6n should be saved and
not defated by technicalities. But the second requirement that the in-
tention of the charitable trust cannot be effected due to impossibility,
inexpediency or impractibility is not technically satisfied and can be met
only by a most liberal extension of the meaning of these terms. And,
the third requirement that the settlor possessed a general charitable
intention underlying the expressed specific charitable intention, although
admittedly satisfied as to the existence of the general charitable inten-
tion, is not applicable because no specific intention has been expressed.
Therefore, although these gifts "to charity" are sometimes sus-
tained under the guise of the application of the doctrine of judicial cy
pres, the more correct interpretation is that these gifts may be sus-
tained in the furtherance of public policy favoring the saving of char-
itable gifts whenever possible 4 and that any statutory requirements
of definiteness and certainty are satisfied by judicial interpretation
that a trust to charity is not vague due to the court's power to appoint
a trustee with discretion to select objects or recipients for the funds.65
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF WISCONSIN
DECISIONS INVOLVING CHARITABLE TRUSTS
Although Wisconsin has now thoroughly committed itself to the
recognition of charitable trusts6 6 and the applicability of the doctrine of
cy pres in qualifying cases involving the alleged failure of a charitable
62 See note 32, supra.
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, §397, comment e (1959).
64 4 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 25, §397; Fisch, op. cit. supra note 27, §4.02.
65 BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 24, §434.
66 See Wis. STAT. §231.11 (7) (1963).
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trust,6" this was not always true. Prior to 1836, what is now Wisconsin
had been part of the Michigan territory. When Wisconsin became a
state in 1848, it adopted much of the Michigan legislation, including the
Michigan statute abolishing any uses and trusts in land except those
expressly authorized elsewhere in the statute.6 This statute as enacted
by the Wisconsin legislature,69 and which had originated in New York,70
was used to defeat a charitable trust in the early and important case of
Ruth v. Oberbrunner.7 1 This case involved a devise of the residue of
an estate, including certain real estate, by a sister of the order of St.
Dominican to the defendants who were of the same order, ". . . to hold
the same in trust for the use and benefit of the order of St. Dominican
and St. Catherine's Female Academy, and for no other purpose, which
is located in the city of Racine in said state of Wisconsin. 7 2 Neither
of the intended beneficiaries were at the time of the bequest incorpo-
rated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, committing itself to what it
concluded was the controlling New York interpretation of the statute,
held that the Wisconsin statute abolishing uses and trusts 73 had abol-
ished all trusts, including those for charitable purposes, except such as
were specifically authorized in that chapter.7 1 Consequently, the court
held it was unable to uphold a devise of real property in trust for the
benefit of an unincorporated charitable association.7 5 It should be
noted that the Ruth decision was also based on the conclusion that
the trust in question did not satisfy the requirements of the 5th sub-
division of section 231.11 which states that a trust for the beneficial
interest of another is valid ". . . when such trust is fully expressed
and clearly defined upon the face of the instrument creating it. .. ."
The court concluded that the trust in question was wanting in all the
,;7Estate of Bletch, note 3 supra.
t" M sic. REv. STATS., Chapter 63 (1846).
69 REviSED STATS. OF WVISCONSIN, Chapter 57, sec. 1 (1849). See the introductory
comment to W.S.A. CH. 231, by the late Oliver S. Rundell, of the University
of Wisconsin School of Law for a detailed historical analysis of Chapter 231,
'XIS. STATS.
70 1 R.S. (1929) page 727, §45. In its present form it is N.Y. (McKenny 1949),
Real Property Law, §91. The Wisconsin chapter, WIs. STATS. chapter 231,
was originally taken bodily from the New York Revised Statutes by 1836 by
the Michigan legislature. It was amended in 1846 by the Michigan legitslature
(see Chapter 63 of Michigan Revised Statutes, 1846, P.V.) by adding the
fifth subdivision which was carried into the Wisconsin Statutes of 1849. This
is now section 231.11(5) except the section when originally enacted did not
contain its present reference to literary and charitable corporations. As en-
acted in18 49 it was as follows: "For the beneficial interests of any person or
persons, when such trust is fully expressed and clearly defined upon the face
of the instrument creating it, subject to the limitations as to time prescribed
in this title."
7140 Wis. 238 (1876).
72 1d. at 239.
73 Note 69, supra.
74 Note 69, supra, §§2-5.
75 The court also held that the trust was passive but because the charitable
organization designated was unincorporated the general rule that passive
trusts are executed by the Statute of Uses was not operative.
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elements of certainty and precision essential to give it validity7 6 because
these words were too general and indefinite in their meaning. The
court noted that no active duty was imposed upon the trustees nor
was any special purpose designated to which the income from the
property was to be applied. And, the court felt that there was nothing
to indicate even that the property was to be applied to a charitable
purpose. This conclusion was founded on the decision that the bene-
ficiary was a voluntary association and there was no criteria for ascer-
taining the nature and purpose of a voluntary society because, unlike
the incorporated organization which objects, purposes and powers are
defined in its charter, the purposes of a voluntary corporation may
change with the will of the associates. 7 Thus the strict requirements
of definiteness and certainty required by section 231.11(5) which
must be compiled within the case of private trusts were deemed ap-
plicable to charitable trusts. In cases subsequent to the Ruth case
the Wisconsin court has on occasion affimed this aspect of the Ruth
decision. But the Ruth case was decided prior to the adoption of sec-
tion 231.11(7) (a) which on its face would appear to exempt chari-
table trusts from the requirements of 231.11(5) where a trustee or
other person is given the power to designate a charitable purpose. The
application of this section is illustrated in the case of Will of Monaghan,
noted later in this comment. And, there are decision which will be
noted in this comment which consider section 231.11(5) inapplicable
to charitable trusts generally. Yet, there are a few other decisions
involving charitable trusts decided after 1917 which do refer to section
231.11(5) giving the impression that this section is still operable when
charitable trusts are at issue. Although this problem relates directly to
the technical validity of a charitable trust at its inception and not to
the problem of whether or not a valid charitable trust can be saved
from failing due to impractibility, inexpediency or impossibility by
the doctrine of cy pres, in actuality the two areas are inter-related.
Thus in the following examination of the Wisconsin decisions the
problem of the requirement of "certainty" under 231.11(5) and its
applicability to charitable trusts will be considered whenever the courts
indicate the statutes applicability or inapplicability.
The New York intepretation followed in the Ruth case to the effect
that all uses and trusts were abolished by then existing statutes was
in conformity with that expressed in the New York case in Holmes v.
Mead."5 In this case it was held that the statute in question abolished
all uses and trusts including charitable trusts and that therefore there
76 Ruth v. Oberbrunner, supra note 71, at 263.
77 "They may be pious today, and impious to-morrow. There is no law to pre-
vent or restrain such changes."
7832 N.Y. 332 (1873). It should be noted that this case was decided in New
York after Wisconsin had adopted the statutes therein construed.
1965]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
could be no trusts of realty except as were expressly permitted by
the statute. However, an earlier New York case of Shotwell v. Mott 9
had held that it was not the intention of theNew York legislature to
abolish charitable trusts. The latter decision by Sandford, then Assistant
Vice-Chancellor, was based on the fact that the notes of the revisors
had dealt with radical changes in the law of private trusts and had
made no mention of charitable uses. Thus, by resorting to that principle
of construction which dictates that the general words of a statute are
to be limited to the subject matter, Sandford held that the revised
statutes did not apply to charitable trusts. This decision was subse-
quently followed by Judge Denio in Williams v. Williams.8" Although
the Shotwell decision was later criticized,81 at the time the statute was
adopted by the Wisconsin legislature in 1848 the Shotwell construction
had not been overruled. The Wisconsin court in the Ruth case recog-
nized that a construction in New York of the statute before its en-
actment in Wisconsin to the effect that it did not apply to charitable
uses and trusts would be good grounds for holding that it was adopted
by the Wisconsin legislature subject to such a construction. This, of
course, is in accord with the rules of construction that decisions by
courts of the state of origin construing a statute prior to its adoption by
another state become an integral part of the statute when it is subse-
quently adopted by another state.82 However, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court avoided this result by noting that the decision in the Shotwell
case was by the Assistant Vice-Chancellor and therefore entitled only
to the respect and consideration accorded a decision of a circuit judge
and not that given to the decision of a court of last resort. Yet, the fact
remains that the Shotwell decision was the controlling decision of the
highest court having considered the problem at the time of the adoption
of the New York statute by the Wisconsin Legislature in 1846. How-
ever, in light of the hostile attitude of the courts during this period
towards charitable trusts, it is easy to understand why the court was
predisposed to accept any available authority which would defeat the
charitable trust. 82
It is this succession of cases following the decision in the Ruth
case to the effect that charitable trusts were abolished in Wisconsin by
statute where the Wisconsin Supreme Court repeatedly states that
the doctrine of cy pres does not exist in Wisconsin. Although these
expressions precluding the operation of the doctrine in Wisconsin were
79 2 Sandf. Ch. 46 (N.Y. 1844).
804 Seld. 525 (N.Y. 1953).
sl Ruth v. Oberbrunner, supra note 71, at 262.
s2 See In re Adams Mach., Inc., (1963) 123 N.W. 2d 558, 20 Wis. 2d 607, 621
("It is a settled rule of construction of statutes that where a statute has re-
ceived a judicial construction in another state and is then adopted by Wis-
consin, it is taken with the construction which has been so given it."
83 Fisch, op. cit. supra note 27, §§4.00 et. seq.
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often obiter dictum, it would seem that the conclusions were often
founded on the failure of the courts to correctly distinguish between
the judicial and the prerogative branches of the doctrine. This failure
to distinguish between the branches may first be found in the Ruth
case wherein at page 257 the court stated:
It may be admitted that this devise would be sustained in
England, and by some courts in this country where the doctrine
of cy pres prevails.
Since the trust in question did not involve a failure due to impossibility,
impracticability or inexpediency it would seem reasonable to conclude
that the court was referring to the doctrine of prerogative cy pres and
not to the traditional judicial doctrine. Yet, on page 264 of the opinion
the court states:
Would . . . [the court] . . . not be compelled to resort to the
cy pres doctrine, establish a trust to frame a scheme to carry out
the charitable intent of the testatrix, where she had no directions,
and had declared in the will no charitable purpose.
It is difficult to determine from this statement exactly which branch
of the doctrine the court is referring to or whether it was referring
to the early common law of England which was very broad in the
matter of charities, so much so that it is now fairly clear that by that
law a gift "to charity" generally, without designation or mention of
any particular kind of charity, or agency, was to be given effect, under
the ordinary equity jurisdiction, at least if the donor raised a trust
for the purpose.8 4 But, this common law was not the doctrine of cy
pres-judicial or prerogative, for it originated prior to the doctrines
recognition in England. Nevertheless, it will be noted in subsequent
cases that the Ruth case is the landmark decision denying the applicabil-
ity of cy pres in Wisconsin and that it generally is thought that it was
the prerogative branch of the doctrine which was rejected.
The holding and rationale of the Ruth case was cited by the court
in Heiss v. Murphy.8 5 However, the court did not choose to base its
decision of the Ruth case. Instead, in this case which involved a will
bequeathing all the testator's real and personal property to the Roman
Catholic orphans of the diocese of La Crosse, with the Bishop of the
diocese designated as having the powers to sell and use the proceeds
for the expressed intentions, the court held the trust void for uncer-
tainty in the description of the beneficiaries. Thus, a strict interpreta-
tion of the requirements of definiteness and certanty as required under
what is now section 231.11(5) resulted in a rather tenuous holding
that the term "Roman Catholic orphans" from a specified area did not
adequately designate who were to be the beneficiaries of the testator's
84 See 163 A.L.R. 784, 786.
8540 Wis. 276 (1876).
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bounty.88 In this case the court rejected the doctrine of cy pres without
distingushing between its judicial and prerogative brances57 But it is
only dicta for so long as the court refuses to recognize the validity of
a charitable trust the first requirement for the application of the doctrine
is not satisfied, e.g., that there exist a valid charitable trust. However,
these cases do represent the hostile attitude of the courts towards
charitable trusts and illustrate the inability or refusal of the court at
that time to distinguish between the prerogative and judicial branches
of the doctrine of cy pres. It is these two facets of the cases which
survived to periodically haunt the court for nearly the following ninety
years whenever the doctrine of cy pres was argued.
Three years after the Ruth and Heiss decisions, in an apparently
mellower mood"" with regard to charitable trusts, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Dodge v. Williams8 9 upheld a testamentary trust for
the education and tuition of worthy indignent females on the ground
that the power granted to the trustee to effect the sale of the testator's
realty and the direction that he pay a specified sum to each of the
designated educational institutions constitued an equitable conversion
of the property and that both the statutes against perpetuities9° and
section 231.11 applied only to trusts of real property. The court dis-
missed the objection that the scheme of the charity was uncertain by
holding that the designation of specfic institutions as recipients of
the funds cured the alleged defect. The reference to the requirement
of certainty would seem to indicate that the court was still closely
s6 It would appear that under the common law rule discussed the designation
of the beneficiaries in this case was more than adequate. But, this case again
demonstrates the attitude of the court that the requirements of certainty
applicable to private trusts under section 231.11 (5) also governed charitable
trusts.
87At page 292 of the opinion the court stated: "There are doubtless cases in
which a devise or bequest to charity as vague and uncertain as the one we
are considering has been sustained. But these cases mainly rest on the doctrine
of cy pres, which is a doctrine of prerogative or sovereign function and not
strictly a judicial power (citations omitted). It is not claimed that the courts
of this state are clothed with other than the strictly judicial power, or that
they have succeeded to the jurisdiction over charities which the chancellor
in England exercised by virtue of the royal prerogagtive and the cy pres
doctrine." It should be noted that the court was rejecting the doctrine of cy
pres as not available to cure an alleged defect of uncertainty-a function the
traditional doctrine does not perform.
ss Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70 (1878), aff'd 1 N.W. 92 (1879). At page 91,
after citing cases to the effect that courts should look with favor upon
charitable trusts, the court stated: "And so it is the duty of this court to up-
hold the charitable bequests of the will in this case, if it can be done without
violating any provisions of statute or principle of law. But, at the same time
it is the duty of the court to carefully weigh the objections made against
the bequest, and to give effect to any sufficient to render the bequest void
in law."
s946 Wis. 70 (1878), aff'd 1 N.W. 92 (1879).
9 The court by way of dicta held that the rule against perpetuities was not
applicable to charitable trusts. See also current Wis. STAT. §230.15 which now
expressly excepts charitable trusts generally and §231.11 (5) which apparently
only excludes literary and charitable corporations organized in this state.
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examining charitable trusts with regard to whether the requirements
of section 231.11(5) had been satisfied although in the Dodge case
the statute is not specifically cited. Although the Dodge case clearly set
a precedent in favor of sustaining charitable trusts of personalty,91
the Wisconsin court did not consistently follow this lead and in a
number of subsequent cases fell back upon the rationale of the Ruth
case and held that charitable trusts were invalid under the Wisconsin
statutes even though the corpus consisted of personal property. 2
With regard to the specific question of whether the doctrine of cy
pres was available in Wisconsin, the courts continued to follow the
dicta of the Ruth and Heiss cases. This refusal to distinguish between
the prerogative and the judicial branches of the doctrine of cy pres
was again demonstrated in Will of Fuller.93 In that case the settlor
set up a testamentary trust ". . . to aid in the support of a Baptist
Colporteur and (or) missionary in the State of Wisconsin." The court
held that the bequest was void on the ground that the trust was
uncertain and incapable of execution. But, by way of dicta, the court
stated :
At the outset it may be observed that the doctrine of cy pres,
so called, is not recognized and acted upon by the courts of
this state. The doctrine is enforced by the English court of
Chancery, and by some courts in this country. But this court
has held that the doctrine of cy pres rested on prerogative or
sovereign power, and was not strictly a judicial power, and con-
sequently the courts of this state could not enforce it. Ruth v.
Oberbrunner, 40 Wis. 238, Heiss v. Murphy, 40 Wis. 276.
9 4
In the Fuller case the court's statement as to the unavailability of
the doctrine of cy pres in Wisconsin follows directly upon the con-
clusion that the bequest in question was void due to uncertainty. Thus
the court would appear to have been reasoning that if the doctrine
had been available it could have been utilized to clear the uncertainty.
But, as noted earlier in this comment, this was never the function of
the judicial doctrine. However, the prerogative doctrine was utilized
where the bequest was "to charity" and this might be considered as
curing a defect of uncertainty. This explanation would substantiate
91 The Dodge case was followed in Gould v. Taylor Orphan Asylum, 46 Wis.
106 (1879) ; Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 28 N.XV. 353 (1886); Sawtelle
v. Witham, 94 Wis. 412, 96 N.W. 72 (1879) ; Beurhaus v. Cole, 94 Wis. 617,
69 N.W. 987 (1897); Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 82 N.W. 345 (1900);
Hood v. Doer, 107 Wis. 149, 82 N.W. 546 (1900); Kronshage v. Varrell, 120
Wis. 161, 97 N.W. 928 (1904); Will of Kavanaugh, 143 Wis. 90, 126 N.W.
672 (1910); Maxey v. Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 128 N.W. 672 (1910).
92 The Ruth case was followed in Estate of Hoffer, 70 Wis. 522, 36 N.W. 407
(1888) ; Will of Fuller, 75 Wis. 431, 44 N.W. 304 (1890) ; McHugh v. McCole,
97 Wis. 166, 72 N.W. 31 (1898); Damforth v. Oshkosh, 119 Wis. 262, 97
N.W. 258 (1903).
93 75 Wis. 431, 44 N.W. 512 (1890).
04 Id. at 435.
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the conclusion that the court when rejecting the doctrine in the early
cases was referring to the prerogative and not the judicial branch of
the doctrine.
In 1897, in the case of McHugh v. McCole,95 the court refused to
enforce a trust for the benefit of two named churches on the ground
that it was too indefinite and a bequest to a Roman Catholic Bishop to
be applied for masses on the ground that it created a trust without
any beneficiaries competent to enforce it.9s What is now section
231.11(5) was specifically cited in the opinion as the basis of the
objection of "uncertainty." The court held that unless the trusts could
be executed by the court, they must fail and following the Ruth and
Heiss cases the court refused to recognize the doctrine of cy pres. But,
again the court implied that if the doctrine of cy pres were available
it would be used to cure the alleged defect of uncertainty. As earlier
indicated, this is not the function of the judicial doctrine.
It should also be noted that the strong objection of the court in
the McHugh case and prior and subsequent cases with regard to the
uncertainty problem was that no beneficiaries were sufficiently identified
so as to be able to enforce the trust. It would seem that since the enact-
ment of Wisconsin Statute section 231.34 in 1945 this argument would
not be valid. Under section 231.34 an action may be brought by the
attorney-general in the name of the state for the enforcement of any
public trust. Thus, the danger which might exist where no beneficiary
is sufficiently identified so as to be able to enforce the trust no longer
exist and this objection by itself should no longer be grounds for the
application of section 231.11(5) to charitable trusts.
It was not until 1900, in the case of Harrington v. Pier,97 that the
Wisconsin court for the first time clearly diffentiated between the
prerogative and the judicial doctrines of cy pres. The will in this case
directed that three-fourths of the residuary assets be paid to two
designated persons ". . . as trustees, to be by them or the survivor
of them expended for temperance work in said city of Milwaukee as
their best judgment shall dictate . . ." with a provision that the greater
portion of the fund be used by three named organizations and that
in case either of these organizations should decide to erect a building
for temperance work, the trustees should so devote the entire fund,
and that all of the fund should be expended within five years. The
lower court held that this bequest was void for uncertainty. The Su-
preme Court recognized that the decision of the Ruth case and the
Dodge case were irreconcilable when the device of distinguishing be-
95 97 Wis. 166, 72 N.W. 31 (1898).
96 This conclusion was based on the assumption that a bequest for masses created
a private trust. This was overruled in Will of Kavanaugh, 143 Wis. 90, 126
N.W. 672 (1910), which is discussed later in this comment.
97 105 Wis. 485, 82 N.VAF. 345 (1900).
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tween trusts of personal property (Dodge) and trusts of real property
(Ruth) was eliminated and that it was now time to choose between the
two theories. The court decided that it was the Dodge case which
correctly stated the law:
It follows that indefiniteness of beneficiaries who can invoke
judicial authority to enforce the trust, want of a trustee if there
be a trust in fact, or indefiniteness in details of the particular
purpose declared, the general limits being reasonably ascertain-
abl or indefiniteness of mode of carrying out the particular
purpose, do not militate against the validity of a trust for
charitable purposes. The court, through its strictly judicial
power, may fill the office of the trustee if necessary, the trustee
can select the immediate beneficiaries or objects within the
designated class and scheme; he can determine upon the details
necessary to effect the intention of the donor within the general
limits of his declared purpose, and execute the trust accordingly;
and the proper public agencies, if necessary, can invoke judicial
power to enforce such execution. At no step is the court required
to exercise cy pres power in the sense of prerogative authority,
or at all, except as the term is found used in regard to those
liberal rules of judicial construction applied by courts of equity
to charitable trusts . . . for determining the intent of the donor
in creating a trust for a designated proper charitable purpose.9 8
With the exception of the Dodge case and those cases which follow
its rationale where trust of personal property were involved, the above
quoted statement by the court in the Harrington case is the first ex-
pression by a Wisconsin court recognizing, in fact if not in name, the
existence and principle of the doctrine of judicial cy pres. The court,
for the first time, fully explains the origin of the confusion between the
prerogative and judicial doctrines.99 The court also apparently clarified
the problem of the requirements for definiteness in charitable trusts
when at page 523 of its opinion it stated:
The degree of certainty that such doctrine requires is correctly
stated in Webster v. Morris and often since affirmed, as we have
seen. That is, "The scheme of charity must be sufficiently indi-
cated, or a method provided whereby it may be ascertained, and
its object made sufficiently certain to enable the court to enforce
the execution of such object. It must be of such a tangible
nature that the court can deal with it. The mere direction to
expend money for charitable purpose at large is too indefinite
98 Id. at 514.
B9 The court noted that the Statute of Elizabeth was thought to be the source
of both branches of the cy pres doctrine and that this statute had been either
expressly repealed or never adopted by the original states. Thus, the court
at page 503 of the opinion states: "When it is said that the doctrine of cy
pres does not prevail in this state that does not refer to those liberal rules
of judicial construction by courts of equity, which prior to the Statute of
Elizabeth were applied in chancery, and of which such statute is only con-




to be carried into execution." 66 Wis. 391. In order not to
depart from the correct line, however, the rule must be con-
sidered, not with reference to the statutory rule of certainty (sec.
2081, Stats, 1898),"' or that which is required in regard to
private trusts, as indicated in Ruth v. Oberbrunner, and perhaps
in McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166, but with reference to those
liberal rules for judicial construction, applicable to charitable
trusts.
This should have settled the question of the inapplicability of section
231.11(5) to charitable trusts. But, although this portion of the
Harrington decision has never been overruled, the court has, as shall
be pointed out, in instances reverted to examination of charitable trusts
under the rule of 231.11(5).
It would be thought that the lucid opinion in the Harrington case
would also have cleared any doubts that Wisconsin, although prefer-
ring to use the term "liberal construction," definitely recognized the
doctrine of judicial cy pres. And, for a number of years this conclu-
sion was correct. Three months after the Harrington decision, the court
in Hood v. Dorer1°t sustained a provision of a will which directed that
the testator's entire estate ". . . be invested in a fund provided for
that purpose for the support and maintenance of the superannuated
preachers of the church denominated the United Brethren in Christ. .. "
as a valid charitable trust by employing the doctrine of equitable con-
version as used in the Dodge case and the principles of liberal con-
struction enunciated in the Harrington case to overcome the objection
of indefiniteness and uncertainty. The court noted that if that same
requirement of certainty as was used in the Fuller case were to be
applied in this instance the provision of the will would certainly fail.
However, the court correctly noted that the doctrine of the Fuller case
insofar as it required that charitable trusts meet the standards of cer-
tainty applicable to private trusts was "substantially overruled" in the
Harrington decision. But, it should be noted that although the court
100 This is now section 231.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes. It was then, as it is
now, inclusive of what is now section 231.11(5). It should be noted that when
what is now section 231.11(5) was originally enacted it contained no refer-
ence to "literary and charitable corporations." What is now section 230.15
did contain the terms "literary and charitable corporations" at the time of
its original enactment in 1849. It is not known at exactly what date the addi-
tion of these terms was made to section 231.11(5) but they were in the section
in the R.S. 1878. Nowhere in the Harrington decision is this fact mentioned.
Apparetnly the court did not deem the addition of these terms to be legisla-
tive approval of prior decisions holding that charitable trusts were subject to
section 231.11(5). Section 230.15 was amended by ch. 511, Laws of 1905 to
include the term "charitable use." No such amendment was made to section
231.11(5). This would tend to support the conclusion that the legislature
did not feel that the term "charitable corporation" was inclusive of charitable
trusts and uses and to some extent explain why the court in the Harrington
case did not feel it was necessary to consider the inclusion of the term
charitable corporation" when it rejected the contention of applicability of
section 231.11 (5) to charitable trusts.
101 107 Wis. 149, 82 N.W. 345 (1900).
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was expressly approving the judicial doctrine of cy pres at this time
it was not using it in the traditional sense for none of the cases involved
a failure of a valid charitable trust due to impossibility, impractibility
or inexpediency. In actuality the court was using the common law rules
of liberal construction applicable to charitable trusts although it had
not reached the point of accepting a trust simply "to charity."
In 1904 the Harrington decision was again expressly approved when
the court in Kronshage v. Varrell'0 2 sustained a testamentary trust set
up for the charitable purpose of relieving the wants, distress and
sufferings arising from storms, floods, fires and other accidental and
natural causes. In assessing the Harrington decision, the court at page
164 of the opinion stated:
This court has decided, disregarding the reasons which some
others have deemed controlling, that there are inherent in all
courts all the strictly judicial powers ever exercised by the
Chancellor or the High Court of Chancery of England to find
means to carry into effect a charitable purpose entertained by a
testator or grantor; that such courts lack only the prerogative
cy pres power enjoyed by the sovereign to apply all goods
devised to any charitable purposes, to purposes never declared
or even entertained by the donor, under certain circumstances,
which prerogative power was in some degree exercised by the
Chancellor by delegation from the sovereign. All that is necessary
is that the devisor shall place his property in trust, and designate
a charitable purpose of his own narrower than the field of
charity generally. The courts can and will then see to it that
a trustee is provided, if none be designated, and that the means
will be found to apply the property to the purpose, if no method
be prescribed. They are limited to the defined purpose, and they
must ascertain it from the words of the testator, but in ascer-
taining it may and will indulge in most liberal construction.
(emphasis added).
The above quoted passage should have dispelled any doubts as to
what was the attitude of the Wisconsin court towards charitable trusts
and that the court reconized the classical doctrine of judicial cy pres
despite the fact that the court continued to prefer to use the term
"liberal construction." Yet, again we find this positive statement re-
garding the doctrine of judicial cy pres being made in a case where
there was no apparent need for the exercise of the doctrine. However,
this fact should not negate the effect of the statements.
A further clarification as to the requirements of definiteness and
certainty in charitable trusts was made in 1910 in Will of Kavanaugh."0 3
In this case, the Supreme Court held that a bequest ". . . for masses
for the purpose of my father's and mother's and sister's and brother's
102 120 Wis. 161, 97 N.W. 928 (1904).
103 143 Wis. 90, 126 N.W. 672 (1910).
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and my own soul" with certain persons designated to direct where
and when the masses were to be said did not create a private trust but
a charitable trust which was valid even though the masses were
designated as for the benefit of specified persons. This is because accord-
ing to the doctrine of the Catholic Church the whole church profits
by every mass since the prayers of the mass include all the faithful,
living and dead. As to the requirements of definiteness and certainty,
the court clearly held that the requirements of section 231.11(5)104
only applied to private trusts:
The bequest for masses being, as we have seen, a charitable
bequest and for the benefit of mankind in general, the statute
relating to trusts (sec. 2081) does not apply. 105
Quoting from Webster v. Morris,10 6 the court again set forth the
degree of certainty required in charitable trusts:
The scheme of charity must be sufficiently indicated, or a method
provided whereby it may be ascertained, and its object made
sufficiently certain to enable thecourt to enforce the execution
of the trust according to such scheme and for such object. It
must be of such a tangible nature that the court can deal with it.
The mere direction to expend money for charitable purposes
at large is too indefinite to be carried into execution. 0 7
In further commenting on this requirement, the Supreme Court in
the Kavanaugh case stated:
The certainty must be determined, not with reference to sec.
2081, States. (1898), or that which is required in regard to
private trusts, "but with reference to those liberal rules of
judicial construction applicable to charitable trusts." Harrington
v. Pier, supra.1
0 8
The court noted the distinction between a private and a public or
charitable trust in so far so certainty is required:
In the [private trust], statutory certainty is required, while in
the [public or charitable trust] it is not. The certainty of bene-
ficiaries in cases of private trusts does not obtain in the case
of public trusts. And this is necessarily so from the nature of
public trust as distinguished from private trusts. 0 9
But, the court did conclude that:
Of course some degree of certainty must obtain even in a public
trust. The scheme of charity must be sufficiently indicated or a
method provided whereby it may be ascertained and its objects
104 This is the current statute section. At the time of the decision in this case it
was §2081, STATS. (1898).105 Will of Kavanaugh, supra note 103, at 99.
10666 Wis. 366,28 N.W. 353 (1886).





made sufficiently certain to enable the court to enforce an execu-
tion of the trust according to the scheme. (citations omitted).
In charitable bequests no trustee need be named, as a charity
will not be allowed to fail for want of a trustee. The person
named in the will to execute the charity will be held to be the
trustee, and, if necessary that he hold the title for the purposes
of carrying out the provision of the will, he will be implication
hold such title (citations omitted).:1°
In 1917 the Wisconsin legislature attempted to clarify the laws of
charitable trust by enacting what is now Wisconsin Statute section
231.11(7) (a) :111
No trust for charitable or public purposes, whether in real or
personal property, shall be invalid for indefiniteness or uncer-
tainty where power to designate the particular charitable or
public purpose or purposes to be promoted thereby is given by
the instrument creating the same to the trustees, or to any
other person or persons.
Although this statute should have superseded section 231.11(5)
and officially settled the question as to the requirements of definiteness
and certainty in charitable trusts, at least where a power to designate
is conferred upon a trustee, it did not constitute legislative approval of
the doctrine of judicial cy pres. In 1923, in Thorp v. Seventh Day
Adventist Church,lu the Wisconsin court recognized this fact and,
in what appears to be a retrogression to the era of when a hostile
attitude towards charitable trusts existed, declared that the same
certainty required for private trusts as set forth in Wisconsin Stat.
sec. 231.11(5) must be satisfied to sustain charitable trusts and that
this lack of certainty could not be cured by applicaion of cy pres
because the doctrine did not obtain in this state. Of course this again
would have been an improper application of the doctrine even of the
court had decided it was available. The court held that a bequest in
trust for the benefit of the "Seventh Day Adventist Church" to be
paid to the "proper trustees" of the Church for the publication and
110 Id. at 102.
l' At the time of enactment this section was Wis. STAT. §2081(7) (1917). In
Will of Monaghan, 199 Wis. 273, 226 N.W. 306 (1929) the court was faced
with a challenge to the validity of a will creating a trust and naming a pro-
fessional trustee. The will provided that the trustee ". . . shall distribute the
net income from said trust annually or oftener in its discretion to such
charities or charitable corporations operating within the County of Kenosha
and the state of Wisconsin as it may deem needy and worthy of aid." In
deciding whether or not such a trust was void for uncertainty the court
cited and quoted what is now section 231.11(7) (a) and held that it was con-
trolling: "That amendment is conclusive of the objection to the validity of
the trust.... There is now no uncertainty or indefiniteness in the trust under
consideration, for the reason that power is given by the will to the trustee
to designate the particular purpose to be promoted thereby . . . The act of
the legislature is remedial and must be liberally applied." (page 277-278 of
opinion).
112 182 Wis. 107, 195 N.W. 331 (1923).
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distribution of tracts and literature that teach the doctrine of the
Church was void for indefiniteness in that it failed "to designate with
any degree of reasonable certainty what Seventh Day Adventist Church,
local or general, incorporated or unincorporated, was meant" and that
this failure to designate the beneficiaries was fatal and that: "In our
state the doctrine of cy pres does not obtain."' 1 3 In support of this
contention, Chief Justice Vinje cited the Harrington case. Thus, in
support of the contention that cy pres does not obtain in Wisconsin
we find the court citing the first case to clear the confused state the
court had been in since 1876.114 The Tharp case is clearly an anomally
in Wisconsin's trend towards the recognition and acceptance of chari-
table trusts and the doctrine of judicial cy pres." 5 Strangely enough,
or perhaps understandably, nowhere in the Tharp opinion is the pro-
vision of Wisconsin Stat. sec. 231.11(7) (a) mentioned as rebutting
any contention of uncertainty. Also, this case, which categorically
denies the availability of the doctrine of cy pres in Wisconsin, did not
involve a situation where there was any need to invoke the operation
of the doctrine for there was no failure due to impossibility, imprac-
ticability or inexpediency unless you extend the scope of impossibility
to cover the fact that the court felt that the designation of the "Seventh
Day Adventist Church" did not signify any specific incorporated or
unincorporated religious body. To this extent the case would be
similar to the Bletch case" 6 and the cy pres doctrine could operate
to designate a particular recipient or beneficiary compatible with the
expressed general intent to benefit the Seventh Day Adventist Church.
Three years afer the Thorp case was decided the court in Estate
of Briggs"7 held that a bequest to the Young Women's Christian
Association of Wisconsin did not lapse even though there was no
organization in existence within the state which could legally take and
administer the fund. The court quite correctly held that the Harrington
analysis of the method in which charitable trusts were to be treated
was directly on point and controlling. How the situation in the Briggi
case differed from that of the Tharp case is hard to understand, but
the court in the Briggs case explained that the fund here could be
administered with the advice of the National Board of the Young
Women's Christian Association because the policies of that organization
113 Id. at 112.
11 See Zollmann, Cross Currents in the Wisconsin Charity Doctrine, 8 MARQ.
L. REV. 168, 172 (1924) wherein the author commented: "Just what induced
the court [in the Tharp case] to do this [cite the Harrington case] is beyond
the author's knowledge . . . Nothing certainly is gained by citing a case which
negatives a propostion in affirmance of it."
115 See Zollmann, Judge Roujet D. Marshall and the Wisconsin Charity Doc-
trine, 10 MARQ. L. REv. 177 (1929) and Boyer, Property Rights of Religious
Institutions in Wisconsin, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 329, 350-351 (1953).
11625 Wis. 2d 40. This case will be discussed in detail later in this comment.
117 189 Wis. 524, 208 N.W. 247 (1926).
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were uniform throughout the country, but that in the Tharp case "the
various Church organizations were not identical in their creed, and
therefore no distribution could bt made without creating discord and
dissatisfaction." Whether this analysis will withstand close inspection
is not important for it is apparent that the court was once again in
accord with the Harrington decision.
However, the doctrine of judicial cy pres was yet to suffer an-
other setback on its rough road to official recognition. In Will of Lott" s
the court held that where the income from a trust was to be applied
to the ministers' salary of a designated church, but failed to provide
for the disposition of the property in case of the failure of the trust,
the corpus became the property of the parent church organization
under provisions of existing statutes.1 9 By way of dictum, the court
rejected the doctrine of judicial cy pres:
Considerable discussion is had of the doctrine of cy pres in
the briefs of counsel. It is admitted, however, this court has
refused to follow the doctrine in the exercise of its judicial
powers. 12 0
No cases were cited by the court in support of this erroneous con-
clusion. In actuality, although the court was acting pursuant to what
it thought was the controlling statutes, it was in effect accomplishing
exactly what would probably have been done if the doctrine were
appiled. This was a perfect situation for the application of the tradi-
tional judicial doctrine of cy pres. In all likelihood extrinsic evidence
would have supported a conclusion that the testator's general charitable
intent was to aid religion, particularly the Baptist religion, and that
in event of the failure of his specifically expressed charitable intent,
due here to the non-existence of the designated beneficiary, the doc-
trine would have dictated that the funds be directed to the parent
organization. The only difference would have been that the trust
would have continued rather than the entire corpus being passed to
the Baptist church free of the trust.
Apparently the Wisconsin legislature didn't concur with Justice
Crownhart's conclusion in the Lott case, or felt that the law should
be changed, for in 1933 it enacted legislation which has generally been
recognized as the statutory equivalent of the doctrine of judicial cy
pres.1 21 The enacted amendments to the Wisconsin Statutes Chapter
231 are as follows:
11s 193 Wis. 409, 214 N.W. 391 (1927).
11 Chapter 64, Laws of 1907.
120 Will of Lott, supra note 118, at 414.
121 Fisch, op. cit. supra note 27, §2.02(c). But see BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 24,
§433, page 409, note 61 wherein only §§231.11(7) (c) and (d) are cited as
the statutory form of cy pres. Technically this would appear to be correct
in that subsection (b) would seem to relate more to the requirements of
certainty for charitable trusts.
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No trust or other gift for charitable or public purposes whether
in real or personal property shall be invalid because of failure
of the donor to indicate the method by which the purpose of
the trust or gift is to be accomplished.
122
In the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary,
no trust or other gift for charitable purposes whether in real
or personal property shall be invalid because the specific method
provided by the donor for the accomplishment of the general
purpose indicated by him is or becomes for any reason imprac-
ticable, impossible or unlawful.
12
3
Where the fulfillment of the special purpose expressed in a
trust or other gift for charitable or public purposes is or becomes
impracticable, impossible or unlawful, it shall be the duty of
the courts by a liberal construction of the trust or gift to ascer-
tain the general purpose of the donor and to carry it into effect
in the nearest practicable manner to the expressed special
purpose .... 124
It should be noted that while these statutes provide for the continu-
ation of a charitable trust in event of impracticability, impossibility
or illegality, they also codify to some extent the requirements of cer-
tainty for charitable trusts. In so doing they give further credibility
to the contention that section 231.11(5) is not applicable to charitable
trusts. Section 231.11(7) (b) provides that the lack of an indicated
method shall not invalidate a trust by reason of uncertainty. This is
because the trustee will be held to have the discretionary power to
choose the method necessary to effect the stated purpose. Subsection (c)
of the statute provides that even where the designated method becomes
impracticable, impossible or unlawful the trust does not fail. This
would seem to be a necessary conclusion following upon the provisions
of subsection (b). Subsection (d) probably most clearly states the
traditional doctrine of judicial cy press for it saves a charitable trust
where the purpose becomes impracticable, impossible or unlawful and
directs that the "as near as possible" rule be utilized.
As is the contention of this comment, the statutes enacted were only
confirmatory of the fact that cy pres had existed in Wisconsin since
1900 when it was accepted in the Harrington case. This contention
was stated in First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Board of Trustees.121 In
this case, the court was confronted with the question of conflicting
claims were to be recognized upon termination of a charitable trust
created in favor of a college which had now become defunct. The
court, in attempting to apply the funds to that claimant which most
nearly approximated the purpose or intention of the testatrix as ex-
pressed in her will, clearly recognized that the only cy pres which
122 "IS. STATS. §231.11(7) (b) (1963).
123 WIS. STATS. §231.11(7) (c) (1963).
124 WIS. STATS. §231.11(7) (d) (1963).
125225 Wis. 34, 272 N.W. 464 (1937).
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ever was repudiated in Wisconsin was that exercised under the
prerogative power.126 The court recognized that judicial cy pres had
existed since the Harrington case and that the amendments to Wis-
consin Statutes section 231.11(7) were merely a codification of that
law.227
An interesting point is raised in the First Wisconsin Trust Com-
pany case by the statement made by the court at page 43 of the opinion:
There can be no doubt that the trust created for Racine college
is a charitable trust within the meaning of that term as used
secs. 230.15 and 231.11(5), stats, Will of Kavanaugh (1910),
143 Wis. 90, 126 N.W. 672.
This statement would seem on its face to lend support to those who
would for one reason or another prefer to contend that charitable
trusts are still subject to the same requirements of certainty under
section 231.11(5) as are private trusts. This author would disagree
with such a contention. It is difficult to understand exactly why section
231.11(5) was cited by the court. The court evidently was attempting
to reinforce its conclusion that they were dealing with a charitable
trust in the case under consideration. But, section 231.11(5) would
not be an appropriate statute to cite for although this section does
refer to literary and charitable corporations it does not refer to chari-
table uses or trusts. And, that the term charitable corporation in section
231.11(5) does not encompass charitable uses or trusts would seem
to be confirmed by the fact that section 230.15, which as originally
enacted 28 made reference to literary and charitable corporations, was
specifically amended in 1905 to include the term "charitable uses."
Further confusion results from the courts citing of the Kavanaugh case
which is completely in accord with the Harrington decision on the
holding that charitable trusts are not subject to section 231.11(5).
Thus, it is contradictory to cite the Kavanaugh case. But, this reference
by the court to section 231.11(5) in relation to charitable trusts is
the most recent by the court. And, although it is to some extent
unexplainable, it cannot be entirely ignored.
This recognition of the doctrine of judicial cy pres in the First
Wisconsin Trust Company case was expressly followed in Estate of
12GAt page 43 of the opinio nthe court stated: "As pointed out in Harrington v.
Pier, supra, in some of the earlier cases the cy pres doctrine was repudiated.
It is quite clear that what was repudiated was the prerogative power exer-
cised by the chancellor, not as a judge, but as a representative of the Crown."
127At page 42 of the opinion in referring to sections 231.11(7)(a), (b), (c)
and (d), the court stated: "These amendments did little more than declare
existing law."
128 The current §230.15 was at the time of the Kavanaugh decision section
2039, Stats. (1898). It was amended by ch. 511, Laws of 1905 by adding the
term "charitable uses" so as to except real property devised to a charitable
use from the operation of that section limiting the suspension of alienation
of real property. See note 100, supra.
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Alead'29 when the court liberally construed the provision of a testa-
mentary trust directing funds "for the purpose of books" to allow
use of the funds for other library expenses since conditions now were
such as ". . . to refider use of the funds in part for other purposes
more needful and beneficial to the library than to expend the whole
for books alone."1' This clearly was an exercise of the traditional
power of judicial cy pres so as to allow the settlor's general intention
that the community have access to a library to succeed despite the
need to deviate from the settlor's specific instructions in order to
accomplish this general intention.
Wisconsin has not dispensed with the requirement that a general
charitable intention be ascertainable before the doctrine of cy pres
may be applied. In Nelson v. Madison Lutheran Hospital and Sani-
torium -3' the settlor had subscribed $50,000 for the purpose of erecting
a sanitorium but on the expressed condition that the sanitorium be a
Lutheran institution, located in Madison, Wisconsin, and that at least
$100,000 be paid by others to help defray the cost of the institution
and that the offer would not be binding on deceased or his estate
unless said conditions were complied with within six years from the
date of the offer. When the conditions were not satisfied the court
concluded that the gifts were for a specific purpose and not general
charitable gifts because of the precise limiting conditions attached.
In commenting on the inapplicability of cy pres to the case the court
noted the requirement that a general charitable intent be ascertainable:
So far as this doctrine is recognized in Wisconsin, it is simply
a doctrine of liberal construction. It applies only where a general
charitable purpose can be found in the terms of a bequest or
gift, and the specific purpose of the bequest or gift has become
impracticable or impossible.'32
The court concluded that where this general charitable purpose could
not be found a resulting trust arises regardless of the absence of
conditions or a reverter clause.133 The court also noted that the opera-
tions of Wisconsin Stat. sec. 231.11(7)(c) and (d) which are the
codification of the judicial doctrine of cy pres are dependent upon
the discovery of this general charitable intent.
In Estate of Thronson134 the court utilized section 231.11(7)(c)
and (d) so as not to allow a testamentary gift in trust to fail where
the corpus was directed to be paid to the "Masonic Home at Dousman,
Wisconsin" which was not a legal entity capable of taking title to the
property. The court, without ever mentioning the term cy pres, held
129 227 Wis. 311, 277 N.W. 694 (1938).
130 Id. at 331.
1.1 237 \Vis. 518, 297 N.\V. 424 (1941).
1.2 Id. at 525.
133 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, §401 (1) and comment a (1959).
134 243 Wis. 73, 9 N.W. 2d 641 (1943).
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that ". . the nearest practicable manner for the court to carry out
the testator's manifest intention that the residue be applied to the
benefit of the Home perhaps would be for it to direct conveyance of
it by the bank to the legal entity having title to the home in trust for
the benefiit of the home. . . ." and so ordered the executor to act.
Another case where the doctrine of judicial cy pres was utilized
to sustain a charitable trust is Estate of Robinson."5 In this case a
trust, which had been adjudged impossible or impracticable of ful-
fillment by the lower court, had provided that when the income of the
corpus accumulated to yield an income of $6,000 a year the income
was to be paid to the regents of the University of Wisconsin for the
purpose of establishing a professorship under certain enumerated
conditions. Due to the expense of administration by private trustees,
it was apparent that the income would never reach the required amount
and that heirs petitioned for distribution. Citing Wisconsin Stat. sec.
231.11(7) (d), the court ordered the trust to be administered by the
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin so that the main
purpose of the trust could eventually be realized. Citing Will of Stack3 '
and Estate of Thronson, supra, the court stated:
... when it appears that if the main purpose of a will creating
a trust cannot be accomplished by continuing the management
of the trust according to the direction of the will but may be
accomplished by deviating the management from that specified
by the will, deviation should be ordered by the court having
supervision of the trust in order to effect the main purpose. 3 '
In Fairbanks v. Appleton,"s5 Wisconsin alligned itself with those
jurisdictions which hold that the doctrine of cy pres may be applied
upon failure of the specific charitable purpose when a general chari-
table purpose is ascertainable despite the fact that the funds are to
be used for the expressed purpose and "for not other purposes." In
this case the restriction was placed on a bequest in trust to the City
of Appleton "for the erection and maintenance of an Old People's
Home in thecity of Appleton where elderly people may go to live
and enjoy the comforts of life at reasonable rates and for reasonable
compensation." The court held that where the city already had an
"Old People's Home" in operation and where there was no need for
another one in the city and where the funds were inadequate to establish
one anyway, the doctrine of cy pres, or more specifically Wisconsin
Stat. sec. 231.11(7) (d), may be used so as to allow use of the funds
for "erection or maintenance, either separately or in conjuction with
its present City Home, of such facilities, services, and conditions as
15 248 Wis. 203, 21 N.W. 2d 391 (1945).
13r 217 Wis. 94, 258 N.W. 324 (1935).
137 Estate of Robinson, supra note 135, at 209.
138 249 Wis. 476, 24 N.W. 2d 893 (1946).
1965]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
are appropriate and essential to make and maintain some part thereof
as a home where elderly people may go to live for the purpose and
under the conditions stated in the will." The testator's restriction that
the funds be used for no other purpose than that originally specified
was not allowed to defeat this slight deviation from the terms of
the trust.
1 3 9
The court in the Fairbanks case commented that the doctrine of
cy pres was not applicable to the Nelson case because there was no
general charitable purpose present. In comparison, it is difficult to
see where a bequest towards the establishment of the "Madison
Lutheran Hospital and Sanitorium at Madison" is devoid of a general
charitable purpose while the bequest "for the erection and maintenance
of an Old People's Home in the City of Appleton" is held to demon-
strate charitable intent. The court in the Fairbanks case based this
conclusion upon the fact that in the Nelson case the donation was
made uider a subscription contract expressing the specific intention
and containing restrictive conditions. It is difficult to reconcile these
two cases on their analysis of whether or not a general charitable
intent does exist, but nevertheless, they are valuable for their exposi-
tion of the requirements prerequisite for the application of cy pres in
Wisconsin.
In the more recent case of Saletri v. Clark,1 40 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, by way of dicta, reaffirmed the principles of the
doctrine of cy pres in Wisconsin. After quoting from theNelson
case and city First Wisconsin Trust Company v. Board of Trustees,
supra, the court concluded:
When the doctrine is applicable, it enables a court of equity
to carry out the charitable purpose of the donor in a way con-
sistent with the donor's intent, although the method he chose
cannot be followed. Sooner than to permit a charitable trust
to fail, it is the duty of the court to apply the property to a
purpose which approximates as nearly as possible the purpose
to which the donor intended it to be applied. Very briefly stated,
when a charitable purpose cannot be fulfilled according to its
terms, equity will attempt to do the next best similar charitable
thing. This is the doctrine of cy pres. 14 '
Bringing the historical analysis of Wisconsin cases dealing with
the doctrine of cy pres up to date is the most recent case of Estate
of Bletch.14 2 This case, 42 years after the Tharp case, for the first
time clears the air as to any doubts which might still be lingering
as to the availability of cy pres in Wisconsin due to the anomalous
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, §399, comment c (1959) was quoted in the
opinion.
140 13 Wis. 2d 325, 108 N.W. 2d 548 (1960).
141 Id. at 328, 329.
142 Bletch, supra note 116.
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conclusion of the Tharp case that "In our state the doctrine of cy pres
does not obtain."'14 3 In the Bletch case the testator left his estate to
the "Masonic Home for Crippled Children in the State of Illinois."
Upon investigation it was discovered that no such entity existed. The
trial court found that there was a distinct charitable purpose on the
part of the testator and by applying the doctrine of cy press held that
the gift be directed to the Shriner's Hospital for Crippled Children
located in Chicago which conducted operations closely reflecting the
intent of the testator. The court recognized the confusion which had
existed due to the failure of the courts to distinguish between the
judicial and prerogative powers of cy pres and that what had really
been rejected in the prior cases was the prerogative power. At long
last the overdue coup de grace was administered to the Tharp decision:
We do not believe that a bequest to a charity must fail when
those purposes are clearly evidenced and there is in existence an
identifiable beneficiary whose charitable or public program and
goals are reasonably close to those expressed by or attributable
to the testator. We expressly withdraw the statement quoted
above from the Tharp Case; we also consider as no longer




From the foregoing anlysis of the Wisconsin cases dealing with
charitable trusts it may be concluded that Wisconsin has traveled full
circle from its early position of hostility towards charitable trusts and
categorical rejection of the doctrine of cy pres to its present attitude
of extending special treatment to charitable trusts so that they may
be sustained and continued whenever possible. In light of the ambiguous
statement by the court in the First Wisconsin Trust Company case it
is not possible to conclusively state that the requirements of certainty
applicable to private trusts set forth in section 231.11(5) are no
longer applicable to charitable trusts. But, the opinions of the court
in the J-Iarrington and Kavanaugh cases would lend support to such
a contention.
The special treatment of charitable trusts also includes, and this
is most important insofar as this comment is concerned, the avail-
ability of the doctrine of judicial cy pres as codified by Wisconsin
Statutes section 231.11(7) (c) and (d).
Although it is clear that Wisconsin is now using the judicial power
of cy pres, it can only be assumed that the court is following the three
step process set forth by Scott for determining if the bequest qualifies
for the application of the doctrine. The court has hot yet as of this
date overtly analyzed any bequest as satisfying or not satisfying the
14 Tharp v. Seventh Day Adventist Church, supra note 112.
144 Bletch, supra note 116, at 48.
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test of all three of these steps. But, from an examination of all the
cases as a whole it is quite clear that all three tests must be satisfied
before the Wisconsin court will act.
The extent of the doctrine of cy pres now available would appear
to be co-extensive with the classical doctrine of cy pres as applied by
the courts of equity in England. But, as of this date the Wisconsin
doctrine does not yet extend to one important class of bequests which
the modem doctrine of cy pres in the United States does cover. This
is the gift "to charity"' '4 5 without any indication of the specific chari-
table purpose to be benefited nor the mode of affecting the trust. As
indicated in this comment, this situation does not technically satisfy
the three step test for the application of the doctrine of judicial cy
pres, but the doctrine is used in a number of jurisdictions to sustain
such a bequest. Also, as noted, such a bequest might be sustained by
a liberal use of the common law doctrine or inherent powers of the
courts of equity without resort to the use of cy pres. Whether the
Wisconsin courts will in the future sustain a bequest "to charity" by
the use of cy pres or by a liberal use of the inherent powers of the
court of equity or whether the legislature will intervene to render
such bequests valid is not known, but it is clear that public policy
dictates that such bequests should be sustained.
LEE J. GERONIME
145 Such a bequest has been sustained where devised in trust with the appointed
trustee given the power to designate the particular charity to be benefited.
See will of Monaghan, supra note 111. See also Estate of Raulf, - Wis.
2d -, 137 N.W. 2d 416 (1965).
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